This study investigates the physical, socio-economic and institutional factors affecting water-use security among irrigating smallholder farmers in Msinga Local Municipality to recommend policy. Cluster analysis was used to classify farmers according to their water-use security status. The logit model was then used to investigate the socio-economic factors influencing farmers' water-use security status. It was found that the water-use security status of farmers was highly influenced by the irrigation scheme in which they were operating. Across the schemes, farmers in the head-end of the irrigation canal were more water-use secure than those in the tail-end. Older farmers and those with larger-sized farming land were more likely to be water-use secure. Those who had spent more years in the irrigation scheme and members of water users associations perceived themselves to be more water-use insecure. The poor monitoring and sanctioning, coupled with the 'soft state' environment, where unruly elements of society are not reprimanded, have failed agriculture in the survey areas as in most South African irrigation schemes. Thus, mere provision of water alone is not a sufficient condition for farmers to successfully farm on irrigation schemes. Instead, government supervision and law enforcement is also required to allow equitable access to water among irrigators.
Introduction
Finding appropriate and effective ways to reduce the magnitude of poverty and improving household food security in Africa, including South Africa, remains a challenge. Growing populations and dwindling resources accentuate the challenge. Water is one of the essential resources in food production, making it a critical factor essential for sustainable agriculture and achieving food security (Wenholdavailable at the right place and time, in the right quantity and quality (i.e. water-use security) is more important than its mere availability (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 1999) . This is because, even though the water is available, the security to use it depends on a variety of additional factors such as institutional capabilities and socio-economic circumstances (FAO, 1999) . People lacking secure access to water are often the poorest, hungriest, and most vulnerable in the world (Hope, 2006) . Hope (2006) also noted that the most marginalised people in rural Africa lack secure access to 'safe water' and have the highest percentage of income poverty, and suffer from regular and extreme food deficit associated with seasonal and inter-annual climatic variability (Hope, 2006) .
In global terms, South Africa is categorised as a water-stressed country with far less water available per person than most other countries. The water deficit caused by low and erratic rainfall and high evaporative demand limits dry-land crop production . Irrigated agriculture presents an attractive alternative under these conditions (Van Averbeke et al., 2011) . Irrigation can greatly improve returns from land, with beneficial results on household food insecurity and incomes (Ludi, 2009) . Improving the water-use security status in smallholder irrigation schemes is vital to ensure the security of livelihoods of many smallholder producers who rely on agricultural production. It is also a vehicle to provide basic needs for, and reduce the vulnerability of, poor people. Improving the water-use security status in smallholder irrigation schemes can benefit farmers directly through increased and more stable incomes from increased cropping intensities and improved yields. Indirectly, they benefit from a more even spread of, and increase in, farm incomes/wages, lower food prices and better nutrition that can improve health (International Programme for Technology & Research in Irrigation & Drainage (IPTRID), 1999) .
In most South African smallholder irrigation schemes, the level of agricultural productivity and incomes remains very low. On the other hand, the security of access to irrigation water is the factor mostly affecting the food self-sufficiency at household level and national food supply (FAO, 1999) . Access to water in an equitable manner and the improved management of water are imperative to sustainable development, poverty alleviation and food security (Bhawana, 2003) . To increase benefits of irrigated agriculture to the poor, it is critical to understand the real socio-economic and institutional factors affecting water-use security levels among farmers. Thus, this study aims to investigate the socioeconomic characteristics of water-secure and insecure irrigating farmers using the Tugela and Mooi River Irrigation Schemes (MRISs) in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, as case studies. The main objectives were to: (i) identify the water-use security status of each smallholder farmer and (ii) identify the factors influencing the water-use security status.
Since it is argued that improved water-use security in irrigation schemes is the key to sustainable smallholder production, this study is crucial for informing policy measures to ensure effective water resource management for food and ecological security. Although many studies in and outside South Africa (e.g., Reddy, 2002; Grey & Sadoff, 2007; Morton, 2015) have qualitatively described the factors influencing water-use security, only a few (e.g., Sinyolo et al., 2014) have provided empirical evidence of how such factors influence water-use security. In South Africa, many studies (e.g., Reddy, 2002; Muller et al., 2009) have analysed the challenges to achieving water-use security at national level while this study focuses on irrigation schemes. This study is similar to the one by Sinyolo et al. (2014) . However, unlike Sinyolo et al. (2014) who used one irrigation scheme as their study site, this study uses two irrigation schemes in order to improve the generalisability of the results. This study used K-means cluster analysis as a better way to identify water-use secure farmers from wateruse insecure ones instead of principal component analysis (PCA) as in Sinyolo et al. (2014) . Although some studies (e.g., Grey & Sadoff, 2007) have identified the physical, socio-economic or institutional factors influencing water-use security, this study provides empirical evidence of the effects of these variables using a single model. This approach is based on the argument that the variables simultaneously determine the water-use security status of farmers. As far as conceptualising water-use security and defining its indicators is concerned, the study agrees with others studies including Sinyolo et al. (2014) , UN-Water (2013) and Grey & Sadoff (2007) on the conceptualisation of water-use security and definition of its indicators.
Conceptualisation of water-use security
Unlike food security, water-use security is a relatively new concept in water demand management literature for both developed and developing countries (Grey & Sadoff, 2007; Schultz & Uhlenbrook, 2007; Norman et al., 2010; Cook & Bakker, 2012; Sinyolo et al., 2014) . Water security has been defined as 'the reliable availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods and production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks' (Grey & Sadoff, 2007, p. 12) . In irrigation schemes, water-use security includes at a minimum: (1) consistent supply of water, (2) sufficient supply of water, (3) good quality of water supplied (i.e., without associated risks), (4) excellent capacity to pay for water and (5) secure claim to water. Thus, water availability does not automatically translate into water-use security (FAO, 1999) . Although water availability per se is the critical factor that enhances water-use security, it is the way water resources are governed and managed that ensures their security of access to irrigation water. Therefore, to enhance water-use security or minimise water scarcity emphasis has to be placed on creating institutional environments that encourage and support the governing capacities of local resource users (FAO, 1999) .
Factors influencing the water-use security status of irrigating smallholder farmers
The factors influencing the water-use security status of smallholder irrigation farmers can be divided into physical or infrastructural (e.g., canals, infrastructure, pumps, etc.), socio-economic (e.g., gender, geographic location in the scheme, etc.), and institutional and organisational (e.g., irrigation committees, farmer associations and rules and regulations, etc.) (Figure 1 ).
2.1.1. Physical or infrastructural factors. Water-use insecurity in irrigation schemes is influenced by a combination of the bio-physical environment and built infrastructure (Norman et al., 2010; Zeitoun, 2011) . The physical environment highlights the hydrological patterns and topographical features of the area while built infrastructure relates to artificial water storage and conveyance facilities such as dams and canals (Norman et al., 2010; Zeitoun, 2011) . Both the bio-physical aspect of irrigation and the built infrastructure determine the reliability of the water supply. Poor irrigation performance, for instance, tends to be associated closely with topography (Regmi, 2008) . Fluctuations in water supply from dams or rivers results in poor levels of water-use security especially for downstream farmers. In addition, canal leakages can also result in poor supply of water leading to water-use insecurity. According to Sinyolo et al. (2014) , the mode by which water is channelled to farmer's plots also plays a significant role in determining the perceived water security level of the farmers. In their study, Sinyolo et al. (2014) found that farmers using either an electric or diesel pump were significantly more water-use secure than those using gravity. Water-use security levels in irrigation systems are influenced by a number of other irrigation challenges. The terrain can cause difficulties since rivers can be disruptive resulting in flooding and canal disruptions.
Several researchers have, however, argued that pursuing infrastructure development alone as a dominant part of intervention in irrigation is destined to fail (Denison & Manona, 2007; Inocencio et al., 2007; Faurès & Santini, 2008; Zeitoun, 2011) . It has been argued that the development of water infrastructure and institutions should go hand-in-hand to achieve water security (Grey & Sadoff, 2007; Zeitoun, 2011; Cook & Bakker, 2012) . Zeitoun (2011) argued that efforts to achieve water security fail because the water policies prevailing in many countries narrowly focus on physical processes. This narrow and deterministic approach blames water insecurity chiefly on physical phenomena and suggests corrections through infrastructural development (Zeitoun, 2011) . Thus, although the physical infrastructure to convey the water could be available, the institutional and governance issues can severely undermine the supply of water.
2.1.2. Institutional factors. Abundant water at the macro-accounting level is of no use if it is not available at the plot level. Thus, institutional capability is a more critical factor than resource availability in achieving water security in agricultural schemes (Regmi, 2008) . In some irrigation schemes, customary rights are not aligned with statutory laws. For example, in the study areas it is taboo for a woman to argue with a man over water scheduling. In some schemes, regulations on water rights are often incomplete, contradictory, and unenforced. As a result, powerful local elites may irrigate their fields first (Bruns, 2007) while others fail to access irrigation water. In some cases, water-users have little knowledge of the laws that define formal water rights. As a result, they lack the knowledge of their legal rights and cannot fight for their access to water. Agencies often lack capacity and incentives to respond effectively to complaints causing severe water shortages especially to those on the tail-end of the canal. Courts are often distant, distrusted, and take years or even decades to deliver verdicts that seem more linked to the ability of litigants to pay than to jurisprudence. Hence, the less privileged members of society fail to fight for their right to water. Technical measurements of water flows may be non-existent, secret, or so inaccurate as to be useless. A study by Sinyolo et al. (2014) found that farmers could do nothing if water failed to reach their plots, hence, becoming vulnerable to water insecurity.
The water-use security levels of farmers are influenced by the geographic location in the irrigation scheme. Farmers who are located in the head-end of the primary canal usually tend to be more water-secure than those located in the middle and tail-end of the primary canal. However, according to Bruns (2007) , deprivation of water in the tail-end sections of irrigation canals is a classic symptom to diagnose the lack of effective institutions for resolving conflicts over water allocation. In South Africa, a number of irrigation schemes face challenges of water distribution because of the poor institutional set-up at the local level (e.g., Denison & Manona, 2007; Hope et al., 2008; Van Averbeke, 2008; Mnkeni et al., 2010; Muchara et al., 2014) .
2.1.3. Socio-economic factors. The socio-economic circumstances of the farmer which include factors such as gender, income sources, wealth status, leadership position, political orientation, geographic location in the scheme, culture and traditions, etc., influence water-use security levels in irrigation schemes. Challenges of water-use insecurity worsen when group members belong to diverse cultural backgrounds, and varying group sizes, and have differences in asset endowments and interests. Given these constraints an irrigation system has to be able to solve the fundamental problems of provisioning and appropriation associated with common pool resources. Intake points and canals have to be constructed and maintained on a periodic basis and working rules have to be crafted to reflect appropriation rights and responsibilities (Regmi, 2008) .
In general, women tend to exhibit lower levels of water-use security due to a number of reasons. Firstly, patriarchal social systems create a host of socio-cultural bottlenecks for women to access agricultural resources including irrigation water (McEwan, 2003; Oberhauser & Pratt, 2004; Mathaulula, 2008) . In most developing countries, access to water for productive use, in general, and for irrigation, in particular, is intrinsically linked to access to land. There is, however, gender bias with respect to allocation of land in most rural areas (International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2012). Many irrigation and land reallocation projects fail to incorporate appropriate gender strategies in design and implementation, which, in many cases, has exacerbated inequalities in allocation of irrigation land (Van Koppen, 1998; Zwarteveen, 2006) . Key decisions regarding site selection, beneficiaries, land (re)allocation and water rights are made during the planning phases of water-related investment projects and, thus, form the basis of gender inclusion or exclusion in the projects (IFAD, 2012) . There is often fierce competition for irrigated land, and because women have less social or political power, they tend to lose out in the struggle and get land located where water supply is poor. Secondly, women are further marginalised by being excluded from decision-making bodies that govern the use and distribution of water (e.g., irrigation and catchment management committees as well as water users associations (WUAs)) (IFAD, 2012) .
The levels of water-use security in irrigation schemes also depend on the age of the farmer. Age of the farmer is indicative of experience and wisdom in handling the water challenges and conflicts in the scheme. Likewise, farmers who have been members of the scheme for longer are likely to be wateruse secure because they have learnt how to ensure water security to their plots (Sinyolo et al., 2014) . Households that are wealthy and those with political power are also expected to be water-use secure because they tend to use their political power to gain irrigation land with secure access to water. According to Sinyolo et al. (2014) , farmers having more off-farm income were more likely to be water-use secure since they could pay for water without failure, thus improving water security especially in those blocks that pay for water. In blocks where paying for water is a prerequisite for accessing water, having higher off-farm income serves as a secure source of money to pay for water (Sinyolo et al., 2014) .
Research methodology
Three main steps were followed to address the main objective of this study. Section 3.1 discusses the methodology employed to identify the sampled farmers' water-use security status. Section 3.3 discusses the binomial logit (BNL) model used to identify the socio-economic and institutional factors influencing the water-use security status of farmers.
Empirical approaches to identify farmers' water-use security status
Based on the definition of water-use security adopted in this study, farmers were asked to rate each of the five indicators of water-use security (i.e., (1) consistent supply of water, (2) sufficient supply of water, (3) quality of water supplied (i.e., without associated risks), (4) capacity to pay for water and (5) security of claim to water) on a five-point Likert scale. The rankings took the value of 1 when the respondent strongly disagreed with the statement, through to 5, when the respondent strongly agreed. Likert scales with at least five categories are recommended as they limit distortions in data scaling caused by ordinal data, leading to reasonably robust correlation coefficients (Garson, 2009) .
There are several methods in the literature for categorising individuals/households. These include hierarchical, K-means, two-step methods, cluster silhouettes, nearest of neighbour, decision tree method and discriminant analysis. This study used K-means analysis because it provides a simple and easy way to classify a given data set through a certain number of clusters (assume k clusters) fixed a priori (Wishart, 1999) . In this case, the researchers wanted to classify farmers into two categories (i.e., water-use secure and water-use insecure). The identification of clusters was empirically based rather than guided by appropriate economic theory (Hair et al., 1998) .
The BNL model to estimate farmers' water-use security status
There is a dearth of studies that have used empirical models to identify the factors influencing wateruse security status of farmers. However, Sinyolo et al. (2014) used Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis to identify the causes of water-use security in Tugela Ferry since their dependent variable was a continuous variable generated from PCA. However, this study used the BNL model since a farmer's water-use security status was a binary variable which takes a value of 0 for water-use insecure farmers and 1 for water-use secure farmers. There are alternative models used in modelling the relationship between a binary response variable and a set of independent variables. These include logit, probit, tobit and gompit. Since the dependent variable was binary, both the logit and probit models could be used for the estimation of the functional relationship between the dependent and independent variables. However, the choice between logistic and probit models lies in the assumption about the distribution of the errors. For the logit model, the errors are assumed to follow the standard logistic distribution while for the probit, the errors are assumed to follow a normal distribution. However, empirical support for the recommendations regarding both the similarities and differences between the probit and logit models by a number of studies including Chambers and Cox (1967) , Amemiya (1981) , Maddala (1983) and Cakmakyapan & Goktas (2013) have found that the logit model is better than the probit model in larger sample sizes (i.e., n ! 300). Since the sample size of n ¼ 345 was considered a large sample for this study, the logit model was used instead of the probit model. The cumulative logistic probability model was specified by Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1981) as
where: P i stands for the probability of the farmer i being water-use secure, Y i is the observed category of water-use security of farmer i (i.e., 1 ¼ water-use secure and 0 ¼ water-use insecure); X ij are factors determining the water-use security status for farmer i, and j stands for parameters to be estimated.
as Z, Equation (1) can be written to give the probability of the ith farmer being water-use secure as:
From Equation (2), the probability of a household being water-use secure is given by (1ÀP i ) which gives Equation (3), which can be written as
Therefore the odds ratio, i.e., P i /(1ÀP i ) is given by Equation (4) as:
The natural logarithm of Equation (4) gives rise to Equation (5)
If the disturbance term ε i is taken into account, the BNL model becomes:
3.2.1. Regression model diagnostics for the logit model. Testing for the overall significance of the BNL regression model was done using the chi-square value and the log-likelihood ratio criteria in line with Greene (2003) . The Akaike's information criterion (AIC) was used for selecting variables in the logit model. The overall model was run using only the most powerful predictors of water-use security in the conceptual framework (Figure 1 ). The degree of multicollinearity between explanatory variables was checked by examining variance inflation factors (VIF). Since the β kj are estimated by the method of maximum likelihood, a large sample of data was used to avoid micronumerosity. The size of standard errors was checked to detect micronumerosity (Garson, 2009 ). The classification accuracy table was used to predict how well the model correctly predicts the category membership of each farmer.
3.2.2. Description of dependent and explanatory variables used. Table 1 provides a description of the dependent and explanatory variables used in the BNL model.
Methods of data collection
Primary data were collected using key informant interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and structured questionnaires. The questionnaire included information on basic household head characteristics, measures of household wealth (such as household assets, livestock, and type of houses), agricultural production activities, household expenditure and income sources and levels. Also, the questionnaire elicited farmers' perceptions of their water-use security status based on the five indicators namely: constancy, sufficiency, quality of the irrigation water, their ability to pay for the water, and The total number of persons in each household WEALTH_INDX An index representing the wealth status of households. Approximated using a five-point Likert scale based on type of houses owned by the farmer DIST_FRM_SCHM Distance between the framer's household and the irrigation scheme SCHEME_YRS Total number of years the farmer has been in the irrigation scheme GRAVITY_FED Dummy; 1 if farmer is using gravity to access irrigation water and 0 otherwise DIESL_PMB_FED Dummy; 1 if farmer is using diesel pump to access irrigation water and 0 otherwise HEAD_END Dummy; 1 if farmer is farming in the upper sections of the irrigation scheme and 0 otherwise TAIL_END Dummy; 1 if farmer is farming in the lower sections of the irrigation scheme and 0 otherwise WUA_MEMBSHP Dummy; 1 if farmer is a member of the WUA and 0 otherwise PART_SCHME_MX Dummy; 1 if farmer participates in irrigation scheme management and 0 otherwise IRR_LAND_SIZE Continuous variable for the total annual income earned by the woman's husband PAY_WATER Dummy; 1 if farmer is paying a fee for water and 0 otherwise IRRG_SCHEME Area dummy: 1 if household is from Tugela Ferry and 0 Mooi River the security of their rights to the water. Key informant interviews and FGDs were done to provide indepth explanations of issues captured in the questionnaires. Two key informant interviews were done with extension officers in each irrigation scheme. Three separate FGDs were done with upper, middle and lower-section farmers in each irrigation scheme.
3.3.1. Study area. Farmers interviewed for the study were sampled from the Tugela Ferry and the MRISs which all lie under the Msinga Municipality. The Msinga Local Municipality is found under the Umzinyathi District which is one of the 50 districts of the KwaZulu-Natal Province in South Africa. The two study areas were selected from a total of 32 irrigation schemes in KwaZulu-Natal mainly because a preliminary survey had established that many tail-end users in both irrigation schemes had been put out of production due to poor access to water despite both irrigation canals being designed to convey water to all farmers. Canal leakages and conflicts over water were also reported in the preliminary study. Thus, the two irrigation schemes were excellent case studies to assess the institutional, socio-economic and physical factor influencing levels of water-use security among farmers. The Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme (TFIS) is located on both banks of the Tugela River (Mnkeni et al., 2010) . Out of the 840 hectares of high potential soils, around 540 hectares are cultivated by between 800 and 1,000 producers, who probably comprise 15% of all smallholder irrigation farmers in the province (Cousins, 2012) . The main canal was badly leaking. Siltation, cracks, leaks of the irrigation canal and dysfunctional holding dams had also became major problems resulting from the inadequate infrastructural maintenance and repair since the 1960s. The majority of plot holders were women. The production of crops was both for home consumption and sale, with the bulk of production being sold. Almost all crops used fertilisers and crop chemicals (Cousins, 2012) .
The MRIS is located on the banks of the Mooi River. Water is diverted from a weir constructed across the Mooi River into a parabolic canal which runs for 20.8 km from the diversion point to the end of the scheme (Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs (DAEA), 2001). The scheme is divided into 15 blocks of different sizes for management and water distribution. The scheme covers 600 hectares and consists of distinctly demarcated plots, approximately 0.1 ha each in size. However, some farmers own or use more than one plot with most of them using about 0.5 ha on average. There are 824 farmers in the scheme managed through block committees (Gomo, 2012) .
3.3.2. Sampling procedures for the survey. Farmers in the two study sites were stratified into three main groups based on the position along the canal, namely; head, middle and tail-end irrigators depending on their position along the primary canal (Table 2) . A proportional random sampling method was used to sample the farmers. Thus, a total of 345 farmers were sampled and this represented 19% of total number of farmers in the two irrigation schemes. 
Results and discussion
The results of this study have been divided into two separate sections. Section 4.1 discusses the results of cluster analysis used to group farmers into categories based on their water-use security status. The section also discusses the socio-demographic characteristics of farmers in the identified clusters. Section 4.2 presents and discusses the results of the BNL model.
Clusters of farmers' water-use security status
Application of cluster analysis to the five indicators of water-use security produced two distinct clusters of smallholder irrigating farmers in the study area (Table 3 ). The analysis of variance (ANOVA) F-tests for 'consistency of water supply', 'sufficiency of water supply' and 'claim to water' are highly significant indicating that these variables discriminate well between clusters. According to Table 3 , the coefficients for the Z-scores (i.e., Zscore(Consistence of water supply), Zscore(Sufficiency of water supply), Zscore(Quality of water supplied), Zscore(Capacity to pay for water) and Zscore (Claim for water)) were negative for cluster 1. This implies that farmers within this group were experiencing inconsistent water supply, insufficient water supply, poor quality of water supplied, poor capacity to pay for water and had insecure claim to water. Thus, these farmers were experiencing low water-use security and the cluster was named the 'water-use insecure group'. This group comprised of the majority of farmers in the study area (i.e., 67.7%).
The second cluster comprised of 51 farmers that were experiencing consistent and sufficient water supply, good quality of water supplied and had secure claim to water. This is indicated by the positive Z-scores for consistency of water supply, sufficiency of water supply, quality of water supplied, capacity to pay for water and claim for water. This group represented the water-use secure group of farmers.
Socio-demographic characteristics of farmers in the two dominant clusters
A comparison of the two clusters of water-use security shows that water-use insecure farmers (i.e., cluster 1) had larger-sized households than water-use secure ones (i.e., cluster 2) (Table 4). They had also spent a relatively greater number of years in the irrigation scheme than water-use secure ones. A larger proportion of men (31.1%) were water-use secure while a larger proportion of women (82.3%) were water-use insecure. The majority of unemployed farmers (91.2%) were water-use insecure while the majority of employed farmers were water-use secure. A larger proportion of farmers from TFIS (75.9%) were water-use secure while the majority of farmers from Mooi River were water-use insecure (48.0%). The majority of farmers using gravity (45.1%) and electric pump (38.3%) for irrigation were water-use secure while the majority of diesel pump-fed farmers (27.0%) were water-use insecure. Likewise, the majority of farmers in the head-end (42.1%) and middle (36.1%) sections of the irrigation schemes were water-use secure while those in the tail-end (51.0%) were water-use insecure. Water-use secure farmers had a higher percentage contribution of their income from agriculture while waterinsecure farmers had higher percentage contribution from non-agricultural incomes.
4.3. BNL model to estimate farmers' water-use security status Table 5 presents the empirical results of the BNL model estimated to identify the factors influencing the water-use security status of farmers in irrigation schemes. The significant P-values (i.e., significant below 5% level) and the associated likelihood ratio chi-square values in Table 5 suggest the fitness of the BNL model. The goodness of fit for the model was further assessed using the Hosmer-Lemeshow test and classification accuracy test. A Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-square value of 8.76 on 5 degrees of freedom with a P-value of 0.3626 indicates that there was no evidence of lack of fit. The classification accuracy of 91.49% indicates that the BNL model classifies a relatively high percentage of known farmers and hence suits the data well. The degree of multicollinearity among the variables used in the BNL model was minimal (i.e., mean VIF less than 10) ( Table 6 ). The standard errors for the estimated Source: Survey data (2013). coefficients were relatively low (i.e., below 10), indicating that micronumerosity (i.e., small sample size) was not a problem (Pedhazur (1997) cited by Garson (2009) ). The AIC and Bayesian information criterion values indicate that the BNL model was the best-fit.
4.3.1. Socio-economic factors influencing farmers' water-use security. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the farmer's age (AGE) indicates that older farmers were more likely to be water-use secure than younger farmers. A unit increase in age increases the odds of a farmer becoming water-use secure by one. Older farmers are more likely to be water-use secure possibly because they are respected in the communities and, hence, are more likely to have uninterrupted irrigation schedules. Moreover, older farmers tend to be water-use secure possibly because they accrued land that is strategically positioned to access more water over years (Titus & Adetokunbo, 2007) . Since age captures the experience accumulated in livelihood skills, older farmers have acquired skills to access water over the years (Albert & Collado, 2004) . On the other hand, younger farmers are less likely to be water-use secure because they invest less time and effort in accessing water because of the perceptions that agriculture is a dirty activity. Several studies in South Africa, including Brown (2012) and DAFF (2009) established that the youth do not like to engage in agriculture because they perceive it as dirty, low paying work and full of drudgery. Thus, the perception that agriculture is a low paying job, suitable for the uneducated, influences younger farmers to invest less time to secure their access to irrigation water. The coefficient estimate for the number of years spent in the irrigation scheme (SCHEME_YRS) was negative and statistically significant. A year increase in the number of years in the scheme reduces the odds of being water-use secure by 0.9. This shows that farmers who had spent more years farming in the irrigation scheme were less likely to be water-use secure. Contrary to this finding, it was expected that farmers who had spent a greater number of years in the irrigation scheme would be more water-use secure since they had more experience in accessing irrigation water. The contrasting results could be explained by the fact that farmers who had spent more time in the irrigation scheme perceived there to be water-use insecurity due to the deterioration over the years in the infrastructure and to competition for irrigation water as a result of the increase in the number of farmers. Thus, such farmers were more likely to express dissatisfaction when rating their water-use security scores. The positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate for the size of irrigated land (IRR_LAND_SIZE) indicates that farmers who had more land in the irrigation schemes were more likely to be water-use secure. A unit increase in land increases the likelihood of a farmer becoming water-use secure by 4.9 times. This finding was not according to expectations. It was expected that farmers who had more land to irrigate would find water inadequate to cover all their plots on their scheduled irrigation days. Due to the 'soft state' environment in the studied irrigation schemes, it was established through FGDs that most farmers who had larger pieces of land were grabbing it from other people and were feared and tended to operate above the law. Such members of society are never questioned for their unruly behaviour and could irrigate even outside their scheduled irrigating days and are more likely to be water-use secure. Some of them do not even listen to the complaints of other farmers. It was also established that other farmers with larger land sizes worked hard and would irrigate mostly at night resulting in them reporting being water-use secure.
4.3.2. Bio-physical factors influencing farmers' water-use security. Farmers in the head-end of the primary canal were more likely to be water-use secure than those in the middle and tail-end. This is indicated by the positive and statistically significant co-efficient estimate for the canal position dummy (HEAD_END). The odds ratio indicates that being in the head-end of the canal increases the likelihood of a farmer becoming water-use secure by 3.1 times. Farmers in the head-end of the canal were more likely to be water-use secure than middle and tail-end farmers because the conveyance of water in the middle and head-end of the irrigation canal is high compared to the tail-end section (Gomo, 2012) . According to Gomo (2012) , the conveyance of water was high in the upper sections of the MRISs because of the minimal leaks from damaged canal walls, minimal deposition and minimal illegal withdrawal of water by pipes drilled into the canal compared to the lower end of the canal. The same situation prevailed in the TFIS.
On the other hand, the parameter estimate for the farmers farming in the tail-end of the irrigation scheme (TAIL_END) was negative and statistically significant. Although water supply from the weirs of both irrigation schemes was sufficient to supply water up to the tail sections of the scheme, lower-end farmers were less likely to be water-use secure for a number of reasons. There was significant deterioration of the canal systems in addition to increased illegal water withdrawals throughout the season coupled with poor irrigation canal maintenance practices. Gomo (2012) found an average conveyance efficiency of 40% in the tail-end of the MRIS, which is far below the 85% recommended for concrete-lined canals. He attributed this to the pronounced leaks due to damaged canal walls, reduced canal capacity due to deposition causing water to flow over canal banks, and illegal withdrawal of water by pipes drilled into the canal base. Throughout the canal there were signs of continuous tampering with the canal resulting in poor water supply to the lower ends of the irrigation scheme.
4.3.3. Institutional factors influencing farmers' water-use security. In addition to the physical damage of the irrigation canals, water shortages in the tail-end of the scheme were mainly due to the ineffectiveness of institutions in the irrigation schemes. Many studies (e.g., Chiron, 2005; Letsoalo & Van Averbeke, 2006a) have indicated that institutional inefficiencies are the major factors causing shortages and inequitable distribution of water. According to Bruns (2007) , deprivation of water in the tail-end reaches of irrigation canals is a classic symptom to diagnose the lack of effective institutions for resolving conflicts over water allocation. According to Letsoalo & Van Averbeke (2006b) , institutional and organisational decline has its most profound impact on routine maintenance of the water distribution system, which includes cleaning and minor repairs. Rules to govern collaboration (institutions) and structures to enforce these rules (organisations) are necessary for effective and sustainable functioning of collective action. However, indications are that such rules were poorly organised in the studied irrigation schemes. Irrigator communities and their volunteer leadership structures, in the form of elected scheme committees, were finding it difficult to enforce rules. There were several illegal pumps along the canal that were being used for extracting water from the canal and yet no institutions in the irrigation schemes had the power to prohibit such activities. FGDs established that the main reason for failure to observe the irrigation rules in the irrigation schemes is the 'soft' state of conditions that is prevalent in the Msinga area, where the government or the police has failed to send a strong message to the perpetrators of terror/violence who take the law into their own hands, against other law abiding citizens. A number of people in the studied communities are feared and unquestioned for their acts of misconduct. Through FGDs, it was established that most farmers fear being assassinated for provoking or taking such people to court or reporting them to the police. According to Letsoalo & Van Averbeke (2006a) and Van Averbeke et al. (2011) , farmers pursuing individual goals (rational individual behaviour) instead of collective goals (rational collective behaviour) challenge institutions and erode organisations of irrigator communities. As a result of such people, most of the rules governing the study irrigation schemes, especially in MRIS, had become obsolete and the formal rules had been superseded by informal norms, values and practices.
The negative and statistically significant parameter estimate for being a water users association member (WUA_MEMBSHP) means that farmers who were members of the WUAs were less likely to be water-use secure. The likelihood of a farmer becoming water-use secure was 0.2 times lower for members of the WUA than for non-members. This was not in accordance with expectations. It was expected that members of the WUA would use their social links and political mileage to get water outside their irrigation schedule. Nevertheless, such farmers were less likely to be water-use secure possibly because they obeyed the irrigation rules and regulations by not irrigating outside the irrigation schedules. However, due to the soft-state environment in the studied irrigation schemes, such farmers remain water-use insecure as malcontents access water outside their regulated times. It is possible that association members had joined them with the hope of changing their water shortage problems amicably. On the other hand, those who were not members of the WUAs were more likely to be water-use secure possibly because they never observed irrigation schedules and were not willing to cooperate with the irrigation management rules and regulations. Although the South African National Water Act -NWA (Act 36 of 1998) stipulates the formation of WUAs to ensure that people use water wisely and that they pay for it, only 16.5% of the interviewed farmers were members of the WUA. Because of the poor cooperation among farmers, a number of studies (e.g., Backeberg, 2003) , have reported the impact of WUAs in most South African irrigation schemes appeared to be very limited and unrecognised. This is different from other countries where other studies (e.g., Huang et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2013) have found that WUAs perform better than traditional management systems in terms of maintenance expenditures, timeliness of water delivery and rates of fee collection.
The water-use security status of farmers in the studied areas differed with irrigation scheme. The positive and highly statistically significant parameter estimate for the irrigation scheme dummy (IRRG_SCHEME) indicates that farmers in Mooi River were less likely to be water-use secure than those in TFIS. This scenario was due to a number of possible reasons. Firstly, the MRIS had never had a major revitalisation programme in recent years and both the primary and secondary canals were badly leaking compared to the TFIS which was still in a better state. Moreover, there was more illegal pumping of water from the canal in the MRIS compared to the TFIS. The irrigation management committee (IMC) was more organised in the TFIS possibly because of the frequent monitoring and sanctioning from the government extension officers who are located close to the irrigation scheme. Due to the better organised IMC, the canal in the Tugela Irrigation Scheme was regularly cleaned and maintained unlike in the MRIS. This ensured better supply of water even to the middle and lower sections of the Tugela Irrigation scheme. The farmers in the lower sections of the Mooi River had already been turned to dry-land farming within the scheme due to the water shortages. The water shortages were very severe, to the extent that the government had to install a diesel pump to supply the tail-end farmers in the MRIS.
The MRIS had very weak organisational and institutional arrangements unlike the TFIS. It was run by three separate IMCs, one for each of the upper, middle and lower sections, but did not have an overall IMC. According to Letsoalo & Van Averbeke (2006a) since farmers on irrigation schemes are dependent on each other, it requires willingness on their part to work collectively in order to achieve their individual objectives. However, the three IMCs were not working together in the MRIS and irrigation activities were poorly coordinated, and the rules to manage the schemes were poorly understood by those in management committees. Moreover, farmers in the MRIS were not part of cooperatives or farming associations and were not willing to pay for water fees. Thus, the rules were poorly monitored unlike in the TFIS.
Although some studies have reported the gender bias in terms of access to agricultural resources including water, as the major constraint to smallholder production, there were no gender differences in terms of water-use security in the study areas. This is possibly because of the governments enacting stricter laws to correct the gender inequalities and violence and their enforcement over the years. It was also surprising that farmers using electric and diesel pumps in the tail-ends of the two irrigation schemes remained water-use insecure despite the installation of these pumps. This contradicts the findings by Sinyolo et al. (2014) who found that farmers using either an electric or diesel electric pump in the TFIS were significantly more water-use secure than those using gravity. Irrigation-specific differences are the most probable explanation for the differences in findings. Unlike their study, this study included farmers using diesel or electric pumps from the MRIS where farmers using a diesel or electric pump faced challenging diesel and maintenance costs. They also lacked the skilled personnel to service the pump and faced challenges in accessing spare parts for the pumps.
Conclusions
This study assesses the factors influencing the water-use security status of smallholder farmers in irrigation schemes of KwaZulu-Natal South Africa. Despite the irrigation canals being designed to supply adequate amounts of irrigation water up to the tail-end farmers, the majority of farmers in irrigation schemes are water-use insecure. Irrigation-scheme level physical and institutional factors are the major determinants of the water-use security status of farmers. The position along the canal is an important determinant of water-use security among farmers. Downstream farmers are less likely to be water-use secure than upstream farmers. Although most studies have identified institutional rules and regulations as the critical factors influencing water-use security among downstream farmers, the physical capacity of the irrigation canal to convey adequate amounts of water is the most critical factor since it can be hampered if the canal is old and dilapidated. Thus, institutional rules and regulations focusing on routine maintenance, including cleaning and minor repairs are critical in irrigation schemes for downstream farmers to be water-use secure. Failure of the canal to convey adequate amounts of water can cause conflicts and failure to observe the irrigation rules and regulations. Thus, addressing the physical factors that hinder the supply of water should be carried out in a timely manner through canal cleaning and repair.
Farmers who do not obey rules and regulations are more likely to be water-use secure at the expense of others. Such unruly elements of society are mostly feared and make sanctioning and monitoring of irrigation rules and regulations difficult. As a result, local institutions to monitor and sanction irrigation rules and regulations are ineffective. Since other studies have found that WUAs perform better than traditional management systems in terms of maintenance expenditures, timeliness of water delivery and rates of fee collection, all farmers in South African irrigation schemes should be coerced to be part of the WUAs to enable them to observe irrigation rules and respect other farmers' irrigation schedules, leading ultimately to the emergence of proper institutional rights to water. Farmers with a large farm size are highly motivated to earn a living from agriculture. Hence, they are more likely to be water-use secure because they have the inner drive to make irrigation water available in their fields.
Considering the 'soft state' environments in most South African rural areas, it is crucial that supervision and monitoring of irrigation rules and regulations be carried out by state agents rather than community members, as the latter leads to failure to observe irrigation rules. Although it is generally accepted that irrigation schemes are more effectively run by self-governed groups rather than by centralised government agencies, the case in South Africa requires that the government deals with the perpetrators of crime first before communities can successfully manage irrigation schemes. Thus, in South Africa, government policy on decentralisation of irrigation scheme management should be implemented simultaneously with controlling the unruly elements of society who do not follow rules and regulations. Only when water access is guaranteed, will the contribution of irrigation schemes to poverty alleviation and food security be enhanced.
